We study the costs and bene…ts of additional information in agency contracts, when there is the possibility of renegotiation. The literature to date assumes that contractual simplicity, i.e. the omission of informative contractual contingencies, can only arise in multi-period environments, and only in a speci…c manner in which it is interim information that is excluded. In contrast, we show that in certain circumstances, it is also e¢ cient to restrict the set of contingencies in a standard one period contract, where all information arrives at once. Although increasing the number of contingencies will always decrease the agency cost, it can have the adverse e¤ect of weakening the principal's commitment not to renegotiate, thus undermining ex ante incentives to exert e¤ort. Applications to several real world phenomena are brie ‡y explored.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the costs and bene…ts of an additional piece of information in agency contracts, when there is the possibility of renegotiation. In the classical model of Holmström (1979) , it is Pareto e¢ cient to make compensation contingent on all signals which are informative of the agent's action, as famously proved in the Su¢ cient Statistic Theorem. However, these predictions stand in stark contrast to the nature of real world contracts, which are typically left relatively simple and uncontingent. Although it is well-established in the existing literature that the threat of renegotiation can make it bene…cial for the principal to restrict the set of signals on which an incentive contract can be based, the prevailing assumption in the literature to date has been that this result only arises in complicated multi-period models of repeated moral hazard/adverse selection. It is assumed that the possibility of renegotiation has no relevance for the optimal set of contingencies in a one period contract 1 . However, we show that this is not necessarily the case. We ask whether the principal could do better if she committed herself to fewer signals rather than more even when all signals are informative of the agent's action, in a one period contract in which all information arrives at once. The answer is, in certain circumstances, yes. We show that although increasing the number of informative contingencies will always decrease the agency cost of providing incentives à la Holmström (1979) , it can have the adverse e¤ect of weakening the principal's commitment not to renegotiate, thus undermining ex ante incentives to exert e¤ort. The key …ndings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Suppose the contract can be based on two variables -…rst, the agent's output and second, a (noisy) signal of the agent's e¤ort which indicates whether output was high simply due to good luck or to the agent's hard work 2 . Clearly, in the full commitment paradigm, it is Pareto e¢ cient to condition the agent's compensation on both signals (à la Holmström (1979) ), and to stipulate a higher payment if high output was due to the agent's diligence rather than luck. This improves the provision of incentives. However, the problem is that this increases the discrepancy in wages received in the best and worst states of the world. If the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, then under this compensation structure it becomes more tempting to provide a bit of insurance to the agent ex post (after e¤ort has been undertaken but before the …nal outcomes are realized). This weakens ex ante incentives. Thus, in this paper we try to capture the broad intuition that parties might prefer not to write contracts which include too many contingencies with very high/low payo¤s for the extreme outcomes, as such contracts tend to be less credible are more prone to renegotiation. In addition to the theoretical contribution, the empirical signi…cance of our results is that there exist many economic environments in which the phenomenon of contractual simplicity arises which do not …t well with the multi-period paradigm assumed in the literature to date. For example, in salesforce compensation, agents are usually rewarded with a …xed annual bonus for meeting a speci…c annual sales target, rather than a tiered bonus with a larger payment for exceptional performance (see, for example, Joseph and Kalwani (1998) ). In executive compensation, incentives are often provided through stock options on the basis of exceeding a single strike price, rather than a more sophisticated design based on multiple strike prices 3 . In venture capital contracting, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) …nd that the entrepreneur's compensation is often based on crude non…nancial performance "milestones" 4 , in which his equity stake increases if the milestone is achieved 5 . Finally, the theory of "yardstick competition" predicts that an agent's compensation should be based not only on his own performance, but also on that of other agents in the market engaged in similar activities. However, this is rarely observed in practice. In all the examples quoted above, it is plausible to assume that the excluded contingencies are observed at the same time as those contingencies which are included 6 , hence it is at least suggestive that a model of contract renegotiation in a one period framework where all information arrives at once is a fruitful approach to exploring such phenomena.
We provide a more detailed intuition of our results as follows. We extend the seminal article of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) by allowing the contract to be based on more than one signal. In their paper, a risk neutral principal engages a risk averse agent to undertake a costly e¤ort which is unobservable to the principal. An incentive contract is written which bases the agent's monetary compensation on a noisy signal of his e¤ort (such as his output), and must o¤er a higher payment for good performance in order to induce the agent to work hard and overcome his "disutility of exerting e¤ort". This exposes him to risk. However, after the agent has acted, but before the …nal outcome is observed, the principal (she) gains from renegotiating the contract in order to shield the agent from risk, by replacing the original contract with a riskless payment which gives the agent the same utility, but reduces the principal's wage bill due to the lower risk premium. But the agent (he) anticipates this at the outset, and realizing that his eventual payment will be independent of his action, will no longer have an incentive to exert e¤ort. Thus, if the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, the …rst-best e¤ort is no longer attainable. In order to eliminate this time inconsistency problem and make the contract "renegotiation-proof", the agent must randomize his action between high and low e¤ort. The principal does not observe the outcome of randomization, which creates a "lemons" problem at the interim stage -if the principal o¤ers an insurance policy to the "good" type who chose high e¤ort, the "bad" type who faces a higher probability of loss will enjoy a rent from falsely claiming to be "good" and accepting this o¤er. If the probability of the agent choosing low e¤ort is su¢ ciently high, then the expected gain to the principal from providing insurance to the "good" type is new corporate partnership found, patents approved, company secures threshold number of customers who have purchased the product and give positive feedback, new clinical tests completed" (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) Table 3B ).
exceeded by the expected cost of rent to the "bad" type, such that insurance becomes unpro…table. Thus, the contract becomes renegotiation-proof.
Moving to our paper, in a world without renegotiation, the principal's sole objective is to minimize the agency cost (or risk premium) incurred in providing incentives to the agent. However, when renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal faces a further objective of minimizing the cost of renegotiation-proofness, i.e. the shortfall in e¤ort provision relative to …rst-best. We show how these two objectives can end up con ‡icting with each other. It is useful to introduce some terminology here. Denote the average cost of incentive provision as the agency cost per unit disutility of exerting e¤ort, and similarly the marginal cost of incentive provision as the marginal agency cost. Whereas the …rst objective requires minimization of the average cost of incentive provision, the second objective requires minimization of the marginal cost of incentive provision. In certain circumstances, these two variables move in opposite directions -although, from Holmström (1979) , including an additional signal will always decrease the average cost, we show that it can actually increase the marginal cost.
We illustrate this e¤ect with a simple example. Suppose the contract can be written on signal Y with binary outcomes fgood; badg, and consider the e¤ects of including an additional signal Z with binary outcomes fhigh; lowg 7 , which is observed if Y = \good".
Given that the combined contingency \good & high" conveys more "favorable news" that the agent has exerted e¤ort than \good" alone, the agent should be rewarded more generously. From Milgrom (1981) , this monotonicity in the compensation structure minimizes the average cost of incentive provision. Next, at the renegotiation stage the principal can alter the original contract and provide (partial) insurance to the agent, for example, by o¤ering a lower wage in the \good" state, compensated by a higher wage in the \bad" state so that the agent remains indi¤erent (in utility terms) but the risk premium and therefore the wage bill incurred by the principal decreases. For the contract to be renegotiation-proof, there must be no gain from providing even a small bit of insurance across any contingencies. In other words, the probability of undertaking low e¤ort must be su¢ cient to ensure the marginal bene…t of insurance is exceeded by the marginal cost (of increasing rent to the "bad" type). We show that if marginal utility is diminishing su¢ ciently fast in income and the wage in the \good & high" contingency increases too much and becomes "too extreme", then the marginal bene…t of insurance provision across \good & high" and \bad" in the multi-signal contract increases relative to insurance provision across \good" and \bad" in the one signal contract. Note that insurance provision is simply incentive provision working in reverse. Hence, put di¤erently, inclusion of the additional signal results in an increase in the marginal cost of incentive provision. Hence, the principal faces a trade-o¤: on the one hand, omitting the additional signal raises the upper bound on the level of e¤ort provision consistent with renegotiationproofness, but on the other hand it increases the risk premium incurred in incentive provision. If the …rst e¤ect dominates, then it is ex ante e¢ cient to omit the additional signal from the contract. Finally, although it is ex ante e¢ cient, ex post once e¤ort is sunk, the principal cares only about minimizing the risk premium, or equivalently, maximizing insurance provision to the agent. Hence, at this stage she gains from reinserting the omitted information into the contract. To prevent this, she must "lash herself to the mast" by undertaking an irreversible investment at the outset which renders the additional signal unobservable to all 8 .
The idea that the principal might be worse o¤ from observing additional information has surfaced in many guises in the agency literature, notably in the "ratchet e¤ect" of La¤ont and Tirole (1988) . There are also a number of more closely related papers which show that in models of renegotiation, making an additional signal observable may make the principal worse o¤ because it makes renegotiation more powerful. But all these models consider somewhat of a special case, in that they require multi-period contracts, and furthermore, it is only ever bene…cial to omit early arriving (or interim) information which, crucially, is observed before renegotiation takes place. The reason for this is that after observing the interim signal, the principal can condition her renegotiation o¤er on the information conveyed by this signal (e.g. she can choose to renegotiate only if the interim outcome was good). This increases the value of renegotiation, thus making the threat of renegotiation more powerful in undermining ex ante incentives. Hence, the principal might be better o¤ restricting observability of the interim signal. Clearly, a subsequent period is required, otherwise observation of the …rst signal has no impact on the value of renegotiation. In our paper, however, including an additional signal can increase the gains from renegotiation even if there are no subsequent periods after this signal is observed. Thus, incentives to omit information can arise even in a one period framework. Put di¤erently, the timing of the omitted signal is irrelevant -it can arrive before, at the same time as or after other signals. We proceed to summarize the existing 8 Some real-world examples of how this might be achieved are given here. If the time between e¤ort being sunk and the …nal outcome being realized is relatively short, then a …rm can commit to restricting observability of information by not setting up the appropriate accounting and information systems at the outset of the project. In venture capital …nance, the venture capitalist (VC) can restrict the amount of contractible information by allocating control rights to the entrepreneur at the outset. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) present evidence consistent with this view -in order to enforce contracts written on "di¢ cult to verify" non-…nancial information such as the outcome of clinical trials and beta-tests, the VC needs to retain control in order to have the power to terminate entrepreneurs who fail to comply. (Similar opportunistic behavior by the VC is prevented by concerns about reputation). body of literature. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) investigate a model of "hidden types" with two "screening" variables which are observed sequentially. The optimal contract under full commitment exhibits the familiar rent extraction-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ and imposes allocative ine¢ ciency in both variables. However, when renegotiation is possible, the agent's choice of …rst period variable reveals information about his type, which the principal is able to use to renegotiate away any ine¢ ciency in the second period variable. Thus, it becomes impossible to use the latter as a screening device. If this is the less costly screen of the two variables, then it is ex ante e¢ cient to restrict observability of the …rst variable in order to harden the principal's commitment not to renegotiate. Hart and Tirole (1988) and Dewatripont (1989) consider related models, in which the possibility of renegotiation results in information being revealed more slowly compared to the full commitment outcome.
Crémer (1995) considers a repeated model of moral hazard and shows how observation of an interim signal about the agent's ability can undermine the principal's credibility in threatening to …re an agent who performed poorly. Speci…cally, after observing this signal, the principal can choose to renegotiate and retain the agent only if he is revealed to be high quality. This increases the gains from renegotiation, thus weakening ex ante incentives to exert e¤ort. Ma (1991) also studies a repeated model of moral hazard, in which the principal would wish to commit not to renegotiate after a short term signal is observed, in order to preserve long term incentives. This can only be achieved through the agent randomizing his action à la Fudenberg-Tirole. In a related model, Axelson and Baliga (2009) show that commitment to non-renegotiation can be achieved without sacri…cing e¤ort provision, by allowing the agent to manipulate and garble the short term signal. This creates a lemons problem at the interim stage which eliminates any potential gains to the principal from renegotiating. A notable exception to the above papers is Hermalin and Katz (1991) , who show that renegotiation can actually be ex ante e¢ cient. If the principal observes a non-veri…able signal of the agent's e¤ort before renegotiating, then the …rst-best outcome can be attained. This is because renegotiation then takes place under complete information, which means the principal can provide full insurance to the risk-averse agent without undermining ex ante incentives. However, the principal would wish to commit not to observe any premature signal of the …nal outcome before the opportunity for renegotiation arises (i.e. she would like to avoid what the authors call "information leakage"), as this would reduce the scope for insuring the agent.
Some other papers in which the possibility of renegotiation leads to di¤erent contractual outcomes are mentioned here. In a recent ground-breaking paper, Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2010) show that contracting parties might actually prefer to write an incomplete contract even when all contingencies are fully foreseeable and describable. The rationale for omitting contingencies is di¤erent to our paper -due to time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions, this gives them the option to defer thinking about decisions to the time when they arise, such that they start o¤ with a relatively uncontingent agreement which is continuously renegotiated in light of new information and becomes progressively more detailed over time. Matthews (2001) shows that the optimal contract under moral hazard, risk aversion and limited liability is a debt contract when renegotiation is possible. Jewitt et al. (2008) , however, analyze the full commitment outcome under similar assumptions, and show that debt is not always the optimal contract. Our paper is di¤erent in that Matthews models only one signal -he does not analyze the e¤ects of including additional signals and instead focusses on di¤erent issues.
As highlighted above, the predictions of our model are consistent with a puzzling feature of venture capital contracts documented in Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) . They …nd that the entrepreneur's compensation is often contingent upon non-…nancial performance milestones, which is especially puzzling, given that they are more di¢ cult to verify objectively than contingencies based on …nancial targets. However, their advantage may lie in the fact that they are intrinsically binary in nature (i.e. the realized performance outcomes can only be "pass" or "fail") and are hard to enumerate into more detailed contingencies. Take the example of a biotech venture in which the entrepreneur must be incentivized to develop a high quality drug. A performance milestone could be written which increases the entrepreneur's equity stake by a …xed amount if the drug receives FDA approval, and keeps it constant otherwise. Alternatively, the performance milestone could be based on pro…t data, for example requiring the entrepreneur to achieve a target of one million dollars. However, the problem is that unlike the non-…nancial milestone, this milestone is not renegotiation-proof -ex post, the venture capitalist would be free to renegotiate and replace the crude milestone with a more sophisticated compensation scheme containing multiple contingencies (for example, a tiered bonus scheme which stipulates a small bonus if the entrepreneur breaks even, and a much higher bonus if he exceeds …ve million). Hence, although non-…nancial milestones make for a blunter instrument in terms of incentive provision, our model provides one possible advantage in terms of strengthening renegotiation-proofness of the contract.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 outlines the contracting equilibrium of the Fudenberg-Tirole benchmark model with one signal. Section 4 extends the model to the case of two informative signals, and solves for the optimal renegotiation-proof multi-signal contract. Section 5 allows the principal to restrict observability of the additional signal, and analyzes the choice between one signal and multi-signal contracts. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains all the proofs. Appendix B considers an extension which allows for the payment of an ex ante rent to the agent.
The Model

Agent
There are two possible e¤ort choices e 2 fē ; eg ; where e denotes the disutility of e¤ort and e > ē (hence ē is interpreted as "low" e¤ort and e as "high" e¤ort), and denote e ē as the disutility of exerting e¤ort. The e¤ort choice is observable only to the agent. The agent is risk averse and his utility for income w and e¤ort e is additively separable, V (w; e) = U (w) e where U 0 (:) > 0; U 00 (:) < 0, U (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and admits an inverse function (:), and for any U 2 < there exists unique w 2 < such that (U ) = w:
Principal
There are two possible outputs or revenues for the principal, g and b, where g > b: The probability of output g when the agent chooses e¤ort e is denoted p g (e), where
. Let I(e) p g (e)g + (1 p g (e))b denote expected revenue. The principal is risk neutral. Her objective is to maximize expected pro…t, de…ned as the di¤erence between expected revenue I(e) and the expected wage cost of inducing e¤ort e. We assume:
The left-hand side inequality in (1) ensures that inducing high e¤ort is …rst-best e¢ cient. The right-hand side inequality is assumed purely for simplicity in order to rule out the "shut down" equilibrium considered in Fudenberg-Tirole, in which the principal chooses not to o¤er any contract and the project is never started.
Information structure
The principal and agent will always receive a veri…able signal Y which is perfectly correlated with output. Thus far, our set up is identical to Fudenberg-Tirole. We introduce an additional veri…able signal Z which is observed only if state g occurs. Z takes only two values h and l. Thus, the state space in the multi-signal information system is fh; l; bg, where h > l > b. We index the state by i. Denote the probability of state i when the agent chooses e¤ort e as p i (e). We assume: (1) the outcomes of signals Y and Z are observed simultaneously 9 , and critically (2) signals Y and Z are both informative of the agent's action in the sense of Holmström (1979) . Formally:
We also assume the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP):
We explain in section 5 below why this assumption is required. Finally, we use the following additional notation throughout the paper:
Contracts
A compensation scheme c(e) is a speci…cation of utility levels U i (e) for all contractible states i, so that the agent receives wage w i (e) = (U i (e)) in state i.
10 A contract c is a pair of compensation schemes fc(ē ); c( e)g from which the agent chooses before the …nal outcome is realized. From the revelation principle, we can restrict the contract space C to all feasible pairs of compensation schemes fc(ē ); c( e)g without loss of generality, since any allocation obtained from a more complex message space is also achievable by a direct revelation mechanism, in which the agent announces his type alone.
Extensive form, equilibrium and renegotiation-proofness
The extensive form of the game is as follows. In period 0, the principal chooses whether or not to make an irreversible investment which renders signal Z unobservable to all. In period 1, the "ex ante stage", the principal o¤ers the agent a contract c 1 on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If the agent rejects the o¤er, the game ends and both parties get their outside options (which we normalize to zero). If he accepts, the agent chooses a probability distribution x over e¤ort levels fē ; eg, where x P rob(e = e): The principal does not observe x or the realized e¤ort level e:
In period 2, the "ex post" or "renegotiation" stage, the principal o¤ers the agent a new contract c 2 on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 11 . If the agent rejects, the original contract c 1 remains binding. If he accepts, the original contract is torn up and the new contract c 2 becomes binding. Then the agent chooses an element from the menu fc(ē ); c( e)g. Finally, the signal outcomes are realized and the agent receives his wage. Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This requires that players' strategies are sequentially rational given their beliefs, and beliefs 'on the equilibrium path'(and also 'o¤ the equilibrium path'wherever possible) are determined using Bayes' rule and equilibrium strategies.
A contract is renegotiation-proof if there is no gain to the principal from altering it at the renegotiation stage, given her beliefs about the agent's choice of e¤ort distribution x. Throughout the paper we restrict attention to such contracts. From the RenegotiationProofness Principle, there is no loss of generality in making this restriction. To see why, suppose that a Pareto improving allocation could be achieved by an initial contract c 
One Signal Contracts
In this section, we consider the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in the case of one signal. This is equivalent to the benchmark model of Fudenberg-Tirole. We outline the solution to their model and highlight some of the main features. (We refer the reader to their paper for detailed derivations and discussion).
The optimal renegotiation-proof contract is described by whichever of the following two maximizes the principal's expected pro…t:
(i) c(ē ) = c( e) = fē ;ē g and x = 0;
(ii) c(ē ) = fē ; ē g ; c( e) = U g ( e); U b ( e) where:
and x x 2 (0; 1) where x is the unique solution to:
The optimal contract in (i) constitutes a full insurance contract, which o¤ers the agent a non-contingent payment, induces him to choose the low e¤ort level with probability one and is trivially renegotiation-proof. The optimal contract in (ii) constitutes an incentive contract which o¤ers the agent a risky payment (notice U g ( e) > U b ( e)), induces him to randomize and choose the high e¤ort level with positive probability and is renegotiationproof provided that x is not too high. Notice that there exists multiple equilibria -the incentive contract is renegotiation-proof for all distributions x 2 [0; x ], and the agent is indi¤erent between all distributions x 2 [0; x ]. However, throughout the paper we assume that the agent chooses the distribution that the principal most prefers, hence
12 12 We explain why the principal most prefers x = x in section 5 below.
Another key di¤erence to the full commitment outcome is that the optimal incentive contract consists of a menu of compensation schemes: a full insurance scheme for the type who chose low e¤ort and a risky scheme for the type who chose high e¤ort. At the renegotiation stage, the principal faces a problem of insurance under adverse selection à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Given that the agent has private information on his risk level, and that di¤erent types have di¤erent preferences over insurance policies, it follows that the principal gains from screening preferences by o¤ering a menu of schemes which provides more insurance to the "bad" type.
Finally, Fudenberg-Tirole show a third respect in which the optimal contract under renegotiation di¤ers from the full commitment outcome: it may give the agent a positive ex ante rent. This can have the desirable e¤ect of relaxing the renegotiation-proofness constraint, which increases the upper bound on distribution x and thus increases ex ante e¤ort provision. In order to simplify the analysis, in the main body of our paper we rule out the payment of an ex ante rent. However, in Appendix B we consider an extension in which we relax this assumption and show that our results remain robust.
Multi-signal contracts
In this section, we consider the case in which there are two contractible signals. We solve for the optimal renegotiation-proof contract by backward induction -this amounts to the following two steps. At the renegotiation stage, after e¤ort is sunk, the principal can propose a new contract o¤er c 2 given her beliefs about the e¤ort distribution x. The agent can choose to either accept or reject the new o¤er. In step 1, we solve for equilibrium in this continuation game. In step 2, we solve for the optimal ex ante contract c 1 and the agent's optimal strategy x, subject to the continuation equilibrium.
As in the one signal case, the principal can o¤er a full insurance contract which induces the agent to choose x = 0. Clearly, given that it stipulates a non-contingent wage, the full insurance contract does not depend on the information structure and is therefore identical to the previously considered case. Thus, in this section we focus on incentive contracts which are consistent with the agent choosing x > 0.
Step 1: Solving for the continuation equilibrium At the renegotiation stage, e¤ort is sunk, hence the principal's problem is to propose a new contract o¤er c 2 which minimizes the expected wage bill given her beliefs about e¤ort distribution x. Clearly, the agent will accept the new contract c 2 if and only if it matches or exceeds the expected utility he derives from the existing contract c 1 . Denote this ex post reservation utility for type ē and e as Ū and U respectively. We write the principal's optimization program as:
subject to:
where (7) represents the principal's expected wage bill given distribution x, (8) represents the ex post incentive compatibility constraints and (9)- (10) represent the ex post individual rationality constraints. We proceed to characterize the solution to this program. This is important for the following reason. In order for the ex ante contract to be renegotiation-proof, there must be no gain to the principal from altering it at the renegotiation stage. In other words, it must be the the solution to (7)-(10). Thus, characterizing this solution is equivalent to formulating necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the ex ante contract to satisfy renegotiation-proofness. We state these conditions in Lemmata 1 and 2 below, then discuss in detail.
Lemma 1. An ex ante contract c is renegotiation-proof only if it satis…es the following conditions:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Conditions (11)-(13) are the direct counterparts of the one signal case -we refer the reader to Fudenberg-Tirole (Lemma 2.1) for a detailed discussion. To summarize, the principal gains by o¤ering a menu of schemes, consisting of a full insurance scheme for type ē (condition (11)) and a risky scheme for type e (condition (13)). Condition (12) states that the ex post incentive compatibility constraint binds for type ē . Equation (14) characterizes the solution for the cost-minimizing type e compensation scheme. A key feature is that it will always be contingent on both signals, namely U h ( e) 6 = U l ( e) (recall that signal Z is observed only if Y = g). This result simply mirrors Holmström's Su¢ cient Statistic Theorem. Given that both signals are informative of the agent's action, both must be used to condition his compensation.
Lemma 2. Let c be an ex ante contract which satis…es (11)-(14). There exists x (c) 2 (0; 1) such that c is renegotiation-proof if and only if x x (c), where x (c) is the unique solution to:
A contract c satisfying (11)- (14) in Lemma 1 minimizes the expected wage bill for given Ū . But renegotiation-proofness further requires that there is no gain to the principal from increasing Ū . Lemma 2 shows that there is no gain from increasing Ū , and hence contract c is renegotiation-proof, if and only if x is not too high. To see why, suppose the principal o¤ers to increase Ū by Ū > 0. This increases the expected wage bill by (1 x) 0 (Ū ) Ū . Doing this relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint which allows the principal to provide a bit more insurance to type e. Suppose she o¤ers to decrease U h ( e) by U h < 0 and increase U b ( e) by an exactly o¤-setting amount U b > 0 thus keeping the agent indi¤erent. Doing this decreases the risk premium incurred and hence reduces the expected wage bill. The expected gain is denoted
For contract c to be renegotiationproof, there must be no net gain from increasing Ū by even an in…nitesimal amount. Speci…cally, computing the limit as Ū ! 0 yields the net marginal bene…t of insurance across states h and b, which must be non-negative:
which, with the appropriate manipulations, yields condition (15). But notice this condition has been formulated with speci…c reference to insurance provision across states h and b, which begs the question of whether it is robust to alternative insurance o¤ers, for example, across states h and l. The answer is yes, because at the optimum the net marginal bene…t of insurance is equalized across the entire set of feasible insurance offers, which means condition (15) for renegotiation-proofness is identical across the entire feasible set. A further point worth remarking on here is that the binding constraint for renegotiation-proofness that the net marginal bene…t of insurance is non-negative is stronger than requiring that the net gain from full insurance, or equivalently the net average bene…t of insurance (de…ned as the net gain from full insurance per unit rent), is non-negative. To gain some intuition, consider full insurance in terms of a sequence of small increments of insurance. Due to diminishing marginal utility, the value of an increment of insurance is diminishing along this sequence. Thus, the marginal bene…t of insurance (i.e. the …rst bit of insurance provided) will be more valuable than the average bene…t of insurance (i.e. the average value of the elements of this sequence). Thus, the constraint that binds depends not on the average bene…t of insurance, but on the marginal bene…t of insurance. Put di¤erently, the renegotiation-proofness constraint depends not on the average cost but on the marginal cost of incentive provision. As we show in section 5 below, this distinction is important -although omitting the additional signal will always increase the average cost of incentive provision, it may actually decrease the marginal cost. This relaxes the renegotiation-proofness constraint and raises the upper bound on x.
Step 2: Solving for the optimal ex ante renegotiation-proof contract
We characterize the solution for the ex ante incentive contract consistent with x > 0, and derive conditions under which it constitutes the optimal ex ante renegotiationproof contract. First, the ex ante contract must satisfy conditions (11)- (14) and (15) in Lemmata 1 and 2. Next, the ex ante incentive contract must satisfy two further conditions:
(17) represents the agent's ex ante incentive compatibility constraint. Given that the agent is required to randomize his action, he must be indi¤erent between choosing high and low e¤ort. Thus, (17) must hold with equality. (18) represents the agent's ex ante individual rationality constraint. This must also hold with equality, given that we exclude the payment of an ex ante rent. We state our results in Proposition 1 below, before discussing in detail.
Proposition 1. The following pro…le constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the multi-signal game: (i) the principal o¤ers ex ante contract c 1 consisting of c(ē ) = fē ; ē ; ē g and c( e) = fU h ( e); U l ( e); U b ( e)g, where fU h ( e); U l ( e); U b ( e)g is the unique solution to the system of equations (10) (which holds with equality), (12), (14), Ū = ē and U = e,
(ii) the agent accepts and chooses x = x 2 (0; 1) where x is the unique solution to:
(iii) there is no renegotiation, if and only if the following condition holds:
Condition (20) states that the incentive contract dominates the full insurance contract if and only if inducing high e¤ort is second-best e¢ cient. Speci…cally, the increase in output due to higher e¤ort (the left-hand side of (20)) must exceed the increase in the wage bill incurred due to the higher risk premium (the right-hand side). Note also that, analogous to the one signal case, there exists multiple equilibria -the ex ante contract c 1 is renegotiation-proof for any value x 2 [0; x ] and the agent is willing to choose any value x 2 [0; x ] given his indi¤erence between high and low e¤ort. It is immediate the principal's expected pro…t is linear in x, and under condition (20), increasing in x. Hence, she prefers the highest possible value of x. As in the one signal case, we assume that the agent chooses the distribution that the principal most prefers and sets x = x .
One signal versus multi-signal contracts
In this section, we turn to the case in which the principal can choose ex ante whether or not to restrict observability of the additional signal Z. We investigate conditions for optimality of the one signal vs. multi-signal contracts, but in order to obtain a complete characterization of the optimal contract, it is necessary to specialize the utility function. Although our results are not general, we believe they are still of interest in that we gain some insight into certain properties of the utility function which ensure our main result (that the one signal contract dominates). However, it needs mentioning that our results do not depend critically on this speci…cation of the utility function and hold for a variety of other functional forms. We start by deriving su¢ cient conditions under which omission of the additional signal relaxes the renegotiation-proofness constraint and raises the upper bound on x. Then we characterize the solution for the optimal renegotiationproof contract and state conditions on parameters under which the one signal contract dominates.
Deriving su¢ cient conditions under which omitting the additional signal Z raises the upper bound on x We state our results in Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 below, then discuss in detail.
Lemma 3. Strict MLRP implies the following ordering:
Proposition 2. Assume the utility function U : S ! < where S = fw 2 < : w < Kg de…ned by U (w) = A n 1 n (K w) n n 1 , where A > 0; K > 0 and n > 1. Assume strict M LRP holds. Let D e + (1 pg( e)) pg( e) pg (ē ) and make the following change of variables:
. Then there exists a critical value 0 < < 1 such that omitting the additional signal Z raises the upper bound on x if and only if > .
Intuitively, how the additional signal a¤ects the renegotiation-proofness constraint depends on how it changes the di¤erential between wages in the "best" and "worst" states of the world. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, inclusion of the additional signal results in wages in the best state increasing too much, such that the di¤erential between wages in the "best" and "worst" states widens, with the result that the renegotiationproofness constraint tightens. First, the assumption of strict MLRP is necessary, without it, rewards in the best state will never increase. To see why, consider two distinct cases:
contingency h conveys a greater likelihood that the agent exerted high e¤ort than g, hence the agent should be rewarded more generously, as this reduces the agency cost of incentive provision. Thus,
ē ) (strict MLRP fails) -although again h conveys more favorable news than g, the di¤erence here is that the likelihood ratio in state l is very low, strongly indicating that the agent chose low e¤ort. To aid intuition, consider the extreme case in which the high e¤ort type never lands on state l (i.e. p l ( e)=p l (ē ) = 0). In this situation, it is more e¢ cient to use "sticks", i.e. penalize poor performance by decreasing the wage in the worst state (l), than "carrots", i.e. reward good performance by increasing the wage in the best state (h) -the latter scheme increases risk (as the higher wage in h must be o¤set by a lower wage in b so that type e's individual rationality constraint continues to bind), whereas the former scheme does not. Hence, U h ( e) < U g ( e).
Next, using expressions (6) and (19), it is easily veri…ed that including the additional signal lowers the upper bound on x if and only if:
where
Condition (22) represents the following trade-o¤: under strict MLRP, including the additional signal increases the wage in the best state (i.e. U h ( e) > U g ( e), and thus 0 (U h ( e)) > 0 (U g ( e))), but also, from Lemma 3, increases the wage in the worst state (U b ( e) > U b ( e), and thus
. Thus, the renegotiation-proofness constraint tightens if the …rst e¤ect dominates the second. Note that the utility function speci…ed above has the property that marginal utility diminishes at a faster rate with income (equivalently, marginal cost increases at a faster rate with income). Thus, as the disutility of e¤ort grows larger, the di¤erential between wages in the best and worst states increases, such that the left-hand side of (22) increases relative to the right-hand side, until exceeds a critical value such that the inequality (22) holds.
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Deriving conditions under which the one signal contract dominates the multisignal contract
We now turn to the principal's choice between one signal and multi-signal contracts. The optimal renegotiation-proof contract is that which maximizes the principal's expected pro…t over the entire space of renegotiation-proof contracts. From the preceding analysis, this boils down to whichever of the following three maximizes the principal's expected pro…t: (i) the full insurance contract, (ii) the one signal contract characterized in section 3 and (iii) the multi-signal contract characterized in section 4. In Proposition 3 below, we characterize the solution for the optimal renegotiation-proof contract and state conditions on parameters under which each of these outcomes constitutes the optimal renegotiation-proof contract.
Proposition 3. Assume strict M LRP and assume the utility function and change of variables speci…ed in Proposition 2.
(a) There exists a critical number 0 < < 1 such that: (i) for any given , there exists positive constant f such that the principal's expected pro…t is maximized by o¤ering the multi-signal contract c(ē ) = fē ; ē ; ē g, c( e) = 13 The following numerical example illustrates that if the additional signal is omitted, the improvement in the distribution over e¤ort levels can be quite substantial. Using the utility function speci…ed in proposition 2, let A = 506, K = 1000, n = 10, and p g ( e) = 0:55; p g (ē ) = 0:45; p h ( e) = 0:275; p h (ē ) = 0:117; ē = 100, e = 10: This yields x = 0:04 and x = 0:30. Hence the probability of the agent choosing high e¤ort increases by 0:26(= 0:30 0:04). fU h ( e); U l ( e); U b ( e)g if and only if I( e) I(ē ) > f and the full insurance contract c(ē ) = c( e) = fē ; ē g if and only if I( e) I(ē ) f .
(ii) for any given > , there exist positive constants c > d such that the principal's expected pro…t is maximized by o¤ering the one signal contract c(ē ) = fē ; ē g, c( e) = U g ( e); U b ( e) if and only if I( e) I(ē ) > c, the multi-signal contract if and only if d < I( e) I(ē) c, and the full insurance contract if and only if I( e) I(ē ) d.
(b) There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which attains the upper bound on the principal's pay-o¤ as characterized above.
We illustrate the choice between one signal and multi-signal contracts in Figure 1 below. If , then from Proposition 2 x x and hence the multi-signal contract unambiguously dominates -it yields both a better e¤ort distribution and a lower risk premium. If, however, > , the principal faces a trade-o¤: on the one hand, the one signal contract improves the e¤ort distribution, on the other hand it increases the risk premium incurred. For any given , if the marginal product of e¤ort I = I( e) I(ē ) is su¢ ciently large, then the gain from higher e¤ort outweighs the cost of higher risk, and hence the one signal contract dominates. Figure 1 : One signal vs. multi-signal contracts
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we consider a model of contract renegotiation with multiple signals. In contrast to Holmström's su¢ cient statistic result, we …nd that omitting an informative signal from the contract can be Pareto-e¢ cient. This result arises due to an e¤ect of renegotiation which has not been previously discussed in the literature -the principal faces potentially con ‡icting objectives of minimizing both the agency cost of incentive provision and the cost of renegotiation-proofness. Although inclusion of additional contingencies always reduces the agency cost, it can have the adverse e¤ect of making some pay-o¤s in the agent's compensation function too extreme, which increases the cost of renegotiation-proofness.
We characterize the conditions under which one signal contracts dominate multisignal contracts. Although our model is very stylized, we believe the results are robust to a more sophisticated modelling environment. For instance, although we restrict the action and outcome spaces somewhat, the broad intuition of our results does not depend critically on these assumptions. A further limitation is that for part of our analysis we specialize the utility function, the sole reason for this being in order to admit an analytical solution. A fruitful extension would be to generalize the utility function in order to understand more fully the economic interpretation of our results and the characteristics of the agent's preferences on which they depend 14 .
A potential application of our model concerns the role of legislated bounds on compensation, for example the use of pay bands and minimum wages and, more currently, the imposition of regulatory caps on bankers'executive compensation. Our …ndings could potentially provide a justi…cation for such bounds on the grounds of e¢ ciency rather than fairness, in the sense that policies which prevent compensation from becoming too extreme could have the advantage of improving ex post commitment.
The …ndings of our paper also suggest broader questions on the nature of the relationship between information and e¢ ciency in the principal-agent problem. We show that under circumstances in which parties cannot commit not to subsequently renegotiate contracts, gathering additional information can induce Pareto-inferior outcomes. (2007) and Kim (1995) ? These and other interesting questions are left for future research.
the constrained set is non-empty, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for characterizing a global minimum. We write the corresponding Lagrangian function:
where and denote the nonnegative multipliers associated with constraints (24) and (25) respectively. Deriving …rst order conditions:
In the …rst step, we prove > 0 and > 0: Summing equations (27) over i yields:
Given that the …rst term is strictly positive by assumption and that is nonnegative, we can conclude > 0 and thus constraint (25) is binding. Multiplying each of the equations in (27) by U i ( e) and summing over i yields:
Taking into account the expression for given in (28) and re-arranging yields:
But note that the left-hand side of (30) is simply cov (U i ( e); 0 (U i ( e))), which is strictly positive by assumption. Thus, > 0 which yields (12). Next, multiplying the equation (27) for i = h by ; and the equation for i = l by ; and leaving the equation for i = b unchanged, summing all three modi…ed equations over i yields (14) . Finally, from a familiar proof due to Milgrom (1981) , the assumption of strict MLRP implies (13).
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
First, from Lemma 1, at the renegotiation stage we can restrict attention without loss of generality to contract o¤ers which satisfy (11)-(14). Next, suppose the principal o¤ers an arbitrary value Ū 0 > Ū . From Lemma 1, the corresponding insurance o¤er to type e must satisfy constraints (24) and (25) with equality. This forms a system of two linear equations with three unknowns, denoted fU 0 h ( e); U 0 l ( e); U 0 b ( e)g, which has in…nitely many solutions. We de…ne a parametric variable . With some tedious algebra, the solution set can be expressed as:
where 2 < and each value corresponds to a particular insurance o¤er. We call this the set of incentive feasible insurance o¤ers C 0 . We split the remainder of the proof into two steps:
Claim 1. The net marginal bene…t of all incentive feasible insurance o¤ers is non-negative if and only if x x (c).
Proof. Using the expressions (31), let denote the unique value of which solves program (23)-(25) (equivalently, let denote the unique value of which equates (14)). Let M (Ū ) denote the expected wage bill for contract c, where:
Di¤erentiating (32) w.r.t. Ū gives:
Taking into account the de…nitions in (31), we can re-write (33) as:
But thanks to the envelope theorem, we have B = 0. This means expression (34) = (1 p g ( e))= ( (p g ( e) p g (ē ))). Making this substitution in (34), with some tedious algebra it is easily veri…ed that dM dŪ 0 is equivalent to x x (c). Finally, by inspection of (15) It is easily veri…ed that sign( i ) = sign(U i ( e; ) Ũ i ( e)) for allŨ 2 (Ū ; Ū 0 ] and all i.
Thus, from strict convexity of (:), we can deduce i 0 (Ũ i ( e)) is strictly decreasing inŨ over the interval [Ū ; Ū 0 ] for all i. Hence (i) the integrand of (35) 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
We split the proof into two steps:
Claim 1. Suppose the principal o¤ers ex ante contract c 1 . The following constitutes a continuation equilibrium: the agent accepts and chooses x = x , and there is no renegotiation.
Proof. Consistent with Bayes'Rule, the principal's belief about the e¤ort distribution is x . Given this, and given that it satis…es Lemmata 1 and 2, contract c 1 is the cost-minimizing solution to (7)-(10), hence there are no gains to altering it at the renegotiation stage. Next, note that Ū = ē and U = e imply that (17) and (18) both hold with equality. This means (i) the agent is willing to accept the contract and (ii) anticipating that contract c 1 will not be renegotiated, and given that he is indi¤erent between high and low e¤ort, randomizing and choosing x = x is an optimal strategy.
Claim 2. The optimal renegotiation-proof ex ante contract is c 1 if and only if (20) holds.
Proof. The optimal renegotiation-proof ex ante contract is that which maximizes the principal's expected pro…t subject to the renegotiation-proofness conditions. Let us partition the set of renegotiation-proof contracts into those consistent with x = 0 and those consistent with x > 0. First, as shown in the one signal case, the pro…t-maximizing contract which induces x = 0 is the full insurance contract c(ē ) = c( e) = fē ; ē ; ē g. Next, we show that the pro…t-maximizing contract which induces x > 0 is c 1 . We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists c 0 1 6 = c 1 which also induces x > 0 and yields a higher expected pro…t. Recall that type ē and type e's reservation utilities at the renegotiation stage are denoted Ū and U respectively. From Lemma 1, a contract consistent with x > 0 must be the solution to program (7)-(10), which, recall, is c(ē ) = fŪ ; Ū ; Ū g and c( e) is the unique solution (expressed as a function of Ū and U ) to the system of equations (10) (which holds with equality), (12) and (14). Next, (17) and (18) must hold with equality, which implies Ū = ē and U = e. The unique solution to this system of equations is none other than c 1 . Hence, there cannot exist c 0 1 6 = c 1 which yields a higher expected pro…t. Hence we can restrict attention WLOG to the full insurance contract and c 1 . Finally, it is immediate that c 1 yields a higher expected pro…t than the full insurance contract if and only if:
x (I( e) X i p i ( e) (U i ( e))) + (1 x )(I(ē ) (ē )) > I(ē ) (ē )
which is equivalent to condition (20).
by:
( (ē )) = (p g ( e) p g (ē )) n 1 0 @ ( e) (p g ( e)(1 p g (ē )) ( (ē )= ( e))p g (ē )(1 p g ( e))) 1 n +
(1 ( e)) p g ( e)(1 p g (ē )) F ( ) > 0 , ( (ē )) > 1. It is easily veri…ed that (i) ( (ē )) is continuous in (ē ), (ii) ( (ē )) = 1 at (ē ) = ( e) and (iii) strict MLRP implies (ē ) < ( e) and the statement of Proposition 1, but substituting Ū = ē with Ū = ē +R and U = e with
